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Introduction
Since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, the central govern-ment has continuously emphasised the importance of respecting, andadhering to, the rule of law as provided in the Basic Law, in particular
in governing Hong Kong issues. It has consistently made the claim that Bei-
jing and the Hong Kong government have largely operated within the pa-
rameters of the Basic Law. Undoubtedly, the Basic Law has been actively
litigated in Hong Kong courts, and the National People’s Congress (NPC)
and its Standing Committee (NPCSC), as the highest organ of state power
in the Chinese constitutional structure, have made interpretations of, and
decisions in relation to, the Basic Law to give meanings to provisions therein
to settle important disputes. The Basic Law has become the focal point in
governing the growing interaction between China’s legislature and Hong
Kong courts and between Hong Kong’s common law system and China’s
civil law system. For the central authorities, the Basic Law is not a sham
constitutional document, a window dressing that can be easily swept aside
and ignored. Instead, the Basic Law forms the foundation for the constitu-
tional design of “one country, two systems.” 
Nevertheless, in response to the changing socio-political landscape of
Hong Kong in the past decades, the central government has resorted to ag-
gressive legality in managing increasing pro-democratic activism and ever-
deepening divisions in Hong Kong society. At several critical junctures, the
central government has efficiently used legal mechanisms as established
by the Basic Law to neutralise political resistance, to resolve thorny issues,
and to stifle pro-independence voices. Legal mechanisms have been effec-
tively employed to legitimise the stance of the central government on the
pace and depth of democratic reforms in Hong Kong. In this sense, the Chi-
nese government seems to have successfully assimilated the strategy of
the British government to “regain legitimacy without (full) democratisation”
(Delisle 2007) during the colonial era. China’s aggressive legality has caused
serious concerns in the local and international communities. The prevailing
perception is that imposing the legality of the Chinese way will eventually
put Hong Kong’s liberal legal order at existential risk, and legitimise China’s
political interference in the name of law (Yu 2017: 60). 
The rule of law in present-day Hong Kong presents a complicated puzzle.
It is not enough to simply laud the 20-year implementation of the Basic
Law or to demonise Hong Kong just because of the looming shadow of au-
thoritarian China. There is abundant literature on the evolution of political
strategies in Beijing’s governance over Hong Kong (e.g., Kwong 2018; Fong
2015; Lau 1988), but rarely from a legal perspective. Questions with regard
to how the central government has deployed the law to govern Hong Kong
and the impact of Beijing’s “interference” in Hong Kong’s legal affairs de-
serve more nuanced analysis. 
This article will examine the evolution and effects of legal strategies that
the central government has used in managing Hong Kong affairs. By evalu-
ating the influences of Beijing’s legal discourses and strategy over Hong
Kong’s legal community, it highlights the dilemma of their struggle between
the thin and thick versions of the law and poses the question of whether
Hong Kong’s liberal common law system can amicably coexist with an au-
thoritarian central authority. 
The central argument is that over the past thirty years, under the en-
trenched “legalisation without democratisation” strategy, Beijing’s legal
strategies for Hong Kong have become more hands-on and assertive, often
at the expense of some core values in Hong Kong’s rule of law. The flaws
and instrumentalism of Chinese-style “rule of law,” or rule by law, have
become increasingly salient, giving rise to deepening conflicts with the
Hong Kong common law system. Under Beijing’s legal strategies, the law
in Hong Kong continues to serve as the handmaiden for a flourishing mar-
ket economy but as an obstructer of liberal political pluralism. Legalisation
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without democratisation has given rise to a worrying trend of rising au-
thoritarian legalism in Hong Kong. Political and rule-of-law advocates in
Hong Kong have begun to share the same fate as their mainland coun-
terparts – struggling between rule by law, which emphasises the formal-
istic and technical sides of legality, and the version of thick rule of law
with democratic morality.
Historical review: The rise of authoritarian
legalism and conflicts between two legal
systems
Law is always intertwined with politics, and this is particularly the case
with the Basic Law. In post-1997 Hong Kong, three critical junctures mark
turning points in the Beijing government’s ruling policy over Hong Kong:
the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the 1 July 2003 protest against the Article
23 legislation, and the 2014 Occupy Central Movement (OCM). The 1989
event cemented Beijing’s hostility toward a fully democratised HKSAR and
gave rise to long-term distrust between Beijing and the pro-democracy
camp. The massive 2003 protest prompted Beijing to change its governing
strategy from self-restrained non-interference to a more active posture. This
new strategy generated an unexpected impact on the relationship between
the mainland and Hong Kong, and increased confrontations between the
two legal systems. To resist the erosion of its high degree of autonomy and
the stifling of democratic development, Hong Kong’s civil society initiated
a series of public protests and campaigns, which culminated in the 2014
OCM and the ultimate rise of the pro-independence ethos. These “[p]opular
protests have generally had a correlation with Central Government inter-
ference to advance its preferences” (Davis 2015b: 295). In responding to
the OCM and pro-independence activism, Beijing turned to a sovereignty
discourse and multiple actions to further restrain the political space in Hong
Kong. In the post-OCM era, Beijing has proactively promoted the “integra-
tion” strategy that was initiated in 2003. Coupled with the changing gov-
erning strategies, Beijing also adjusted its legal discourse and action.
Although “legalisation without democratisation” has remained the central
feature characterising Beijing’s strategy over Hong Kong from the outset,
Beijing has turned from a hands-off non-interference policy to a more
hands-on, assertive stance in legalising its authority over Hong Kong. Influ-
enced by Beijing’s hardening legal measures, Hong Kong has witnessed the
potential rise of authoritarian legalism, as the central and local authorities
have increasingly used the institutions and mechanisms of law to bolster
their exercise of power and curtail political opposition. 
1989 June Fourth Incident: The adoption of the
“legalisation without democratisation” strategy and
mutual-non-interference policy
In designing the political system for post-1997 Hong Kong, Beijing inten-
tionally inherited the colonial political-economic system without any at-
tempt at full democratisation (Deng 1987). However, in the 1980s the
decolonisation process itself triggered pro-democracy demands in Hong
Kong civil society and bottom-up pressure for more democratic input into
the Basic Law (Ma 2017). During the drafting of the Basic Law, pro-democ-
racy forces actively bargained for full democracy while Beijing opted for
slow-paced, limited democratisation, but the two sides managed to main-
tain a relatively amicable relationship, partly because the latter regarded
the democrats as “patriots” who supported the transfer of sovereignty, and
partly because the democrats were not politically influential and were not
perceived as a political challenge. The 1980s also witnessed a relatively open
environment regarding political reform in the mainland. Some open-minded
central leaders, such as Hu Qili, even championed freedom of speech in
Hong Kong. Hu once urged mainland officials to consider allowing Hong
Kong newspapers and magazines to enter the mainland after 1997 and to
reform media regulation in the mainland (Wu 1998: 31). This liberal-minded
attitude was never seen again after 1989.
As many have noted, the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown was a major wa-
tershed for democratic development in Hong Kong. The event also had a
significant impact on the drafting of the Basic Law as tension and distrust
intensified between Beijing and the pro-democracy camp. After the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown, Beijing took a tougher approach with regard to Hong
Kong affairs and a more cautious attitude toward full democracy, in fear
that democratisation in Hong Kong would effect political change in the
mainland. The tougher stance was best illustrated by the different versions
of Article 23 of the Basic Law before and after the Tiananmen crackdown
(Petersen 2005: 17-20). (1) It was in this period that Beijing coined the fa-
mous maxim “the well water does not intrude on the river” (jingshui bufan
heshui 井水不犯河水) (ibid.: 18), i.e., a policy of separation and mutual non-
interference. It was also viewed as a “veiled threat that Hong Kong should
not become involved in mainland politics.” (2) Since the 1989 crackdown,
the “legalisation without democratisation” strategy has become entrenched
as one of the national strategies for both Hong Kong and the mainland.
Since the promulgation of the Basic Law, the central government has fre-
quently used it as the basic anchor for espousing rule of law – legal mech-
anisms were designed from the outset to control the pace of
democratisation, to limit the space of democracy, and ultimately to prevent
Hong Kong from becoming a base for subverting the socialist system in the
mainland. 
July 1 2003 protest and Article 23 legislation: From
non-interference to the assertion of the central
authorities
Right after the 1997 handover, the HKSAR immediately confronted con-
stitutional and legal issues regarding interpretation of the Basic Law (Chen
2007: 167). While the 1999 NPCSC interpretation signified the first formal
legal interaction between the central government and HKSAR, the central
government largely maintained a self-restrained attitude towards Hong
Kong governance up until 2003. However, the 1999 NPCSC interpretation,
although issued in a responsive way, set a precedent for the central govern-
ment to use constitutional interpretation to address Hong Kong’s rule of
law concerns. Basic Law interpretation has become the most common, if
not the only, legal method Beijing uses to interact with Hong Kong on core
issues relating to implementation of the Basic Law. The 1999 NPCSC inter-
pretation provoked the first protest by legal professionals in Hong Kong,
who criticised the interpretation as being done at the expense of judicial
independence and at great social cost (Chan 2014: 177). Although the event
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itself did not fundamentally change Beijing’s governing strategies, it sig-
nalled to the legal communities in both Hong Kong and the mainland where
potential pressure points and conflict might lie in the interaction of two
different legal systems. After the 1999 NPCSC interpretation, the Standing
Committee did not issue any interpretation until 2004.
However, the march on 1 July 2003 against the national security bill
marked a dramatic turning point for Beijing’s strategy in governing Hong
Kong. Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong is duty-bound to enact
local legislation to safeguard China’s national security. The Beijing authori-
ties demanded initiation of the legislative process but left the process en-
tirely to Hong Kong, as stipulated in the Basic Law. The proposed Article 23
legislation triggered widespread discontent, resulting in an unprecedented
street protest by an estimated 500,000 people. Beijing, on the other hand,
regarded the protest as a sign that “Hong Kong people’s hearts haven’t re-
turned to the motherland,” and a strong sense of betrayal and fear that
Hong Kong was slipping away led the Central Government to abandon its
non-interventionist stance and adopt a policy of “doing what should be
done while leaving the rest alone” (yousuowei, yousuobuwei 有所为,有所
不为). (3) After the massive march, the Central Hong Kong and Macao Work
Coordination Group of the Chinese Communist Party was set up, headed by
the highest central leadership (Lo 2007: 179). A series of measures was ini-
tiated, aimed at boosting the Hong Kong economy and facilitating the in-
tegration of Hong Kong with the mainland. The central government,
particularly the Liaison Office, increased its presence and capacity in Hong
Kong, and as a result, its influence in the political arena started to grow
(Cheung 2012: 324). 
Correspondingly, the Beijing authorities and pro-establishment legal schol-
ars also tried to reshape Basic Law discourse to serve the new governing
strategy. For instance, in 2004, the Beijing and Hong Kong authorities began
to emphasise the notion of “executive-led government,” which is not ex-
plicitly prescribed in the Basic Law. The stress on “executive-led govern-
ment” is closely related to affirming the central government’s power over
Hong Kong (Chen 2005: 10). Another Basic Law discourse constructed and
re-emphasised by Beijing was the supervisory power of the NPCSC over the
HKSAR, (4) which was later formally adopted in a 2014 White Paper. (5)
During the ten-year period between 2003 and 2013, the NPCSC issued
three more interpretations: the 2004 Interpretation on Hong Kong’s political
reform, the 2005 Interpretation on the term of the Chief Executive (CE) of
the HKSAR, and the 2011 Interpretation on the Congo Case (see Table 1).
The 2005 and 2011 interpretations were both issued on the request of the
HKSAR, and the 2004 interpretation was initiated by the NPCSC. Despite
the limited number of such cases, interpretation of the Basic Law has be-
come a battlefield for defining autonomy (Chan 2014: 177).
The promulgation of the 2004 Interpretations reflected the failure of the
1 July 2003 march to pressure Beijing into offering a compromise on polit-
ical reform, despite some perceived concessions that were made such as
suspension of the Article 23 legislation and the resignation of the then Chief
Executive. The 2004 NPCSC interpretation, reflecting a more assertive cen-
tral government, not only denied the 2007/8 universal suffrage scheme but
also set out specific and stricter procedures for Hong Kong’s political re-
forms than what was originally proscribed in the Basic Law. The 2004 NPCSC
Interpretation, along with the 2007 NPCSC decision,(6) controlled and
curbed the pace of universal suffrage reform in Hong Kong. As Chan per-
ceptively pointed out, the NPCSC conveyed a clear message that Beijing is
in control of Hong Kong’s democratic development. “The central govern-
ment is not content with just having a veto power to disallow any political
change, but wants full control to decide whether any change is proposed in
the first place (Chan 2014: 177).” 
2014 Occupy Central Movement: Enhancing
constitutional integration
Although Hong Kong has gone one step forward in democratisation thanks
to the 2012 election reform resulting from compromises between Beijing
and the pro-democratic parties in 2010, it is still far from the universal suf-
frage demanded by the pro-democracy bloc. In January 2013, Benny Tai
publicly put forward the idea of “Occupying Central” to mobilise public sup-
port for genuine universal suffrage. (7) Since then, unprecedented wrestling
has occurred between Beijing and pro-democratic forces as well as between
the legal communities in Hong Kong and the mainland. The central author-
ities have persistently taken a hard-line stand since the initiation of the
OCM. On 10 June 2014, China’s State Council for the first time issued a
white paper on the Hong Kong issue, which officially proclaimed that the
central government has “plenary power to govern Hong Kong.” (8) The con-
cept was later adopted in Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) in 2017. (9) Following the white
paper, on 31 August 2014, the NPCSC issued a decision (commonly known
as the 831 decision), which laid down a highly restrictive and conservative
scheme for the 2017 election of the Chief Executive and de facto barred all
opposition candidates from running for the position of CE. (10) The white
paper and the 831 decision were fiercely criticised by many Hong Kong aca-
demics and activists for trampling on the Basic Law and the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration. This ultimately triggered the OCM and the rise of
pro-independence activism following the failure of the OCM (Davis 2015a:
107-9). Before and throughout the OCM, the unlawful nature of civil dis-
obedience was one of the focal points of attack by Beijing (Zhu 2017: 168),
which portrayed itself as the firmest defender of Hong Kong’s rule of law. 
Like the 2003 march, the OCM also failed to pressure Beijing into making
any concessions on democratic reform. In response, more radicalised pro-
independence activism emerged in the post-OCM period, significantly
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changing Hong Kong’s political and legal dynamics. In addressing pro-demo-
cratic forces and pro-separatism localists, Beijing has adopted different at-
titudes (Kwong 2018) as well as legal tactics. 
Despite its strong condemnation of the OCM, in the post-OCM period
Beijing has largely left OCM-related cases to the Hong Kong judiciary, and
the central government has rarely directly interfered with OCM-related tri-
als. Despite criticism of some cases from both the establishment and pro-
democratic blocs, the independence and neutrality of the courts have been
largely recognised by mainstream legal professionals in Hong Kong. (11) While
a few scholarly articles and pro-Beijing media comments were critical of
judgements in some high-profile cases and cast doubt on the political values
of foreign judges, specifically in the “seven policemen” case, (12) such criti-
cisms were quickly refuted by leading figures in Hong Kong’s legal commu-
nity and were firmly rejected in practice when the terms of three foreign
non-permanent CFA judges were extended in 2018. (13)
By contrast, the central government has taken a much tougher stance to-
ward pro-independence activists and has aggressively and controversially
used the law as a potent arsenal to prevent pro-independence activists from
entering formal political institutions and from gathering further political
momentum (see Yuen and Chung 2018). Two elected pro-independence
LegCo members were unseated for failing to properly swear allegiance to
the HKSAR and to maintain the Basic Law at their LegCo inauguration. Sub-
sequently, four other pan-democratic LegCo members were also disqualified
for their disputed manner of oath-taking, emasculating the majority veto
power that the pan-democratic bloc has always had in LegCo. (14)
Despite being a highly charged political matter, the 2016 oath-taking con-
tention was swiftly resolved by a combination of legal measures employed
by the Hong Kong and central authorities and endorsed by the courts. The
HKSAR administration successfully initiated a time – and money – con-
suming judicial review process to disqualify non-establishment political ri-
vals on a highly selective basis. Delivering a fatal blow to pro-independence
activism, the NPCSC issued its most controversial interpretation in the mid-
dle of a trial, specifying the requirements for valid oath-taking and for any
candidates interested in running for public office. That interpretation not
only had a direct impact on the oath-taking cases but also bars any other
candidates who would challenge China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. The
legality and authority of the controversial NPCSC interpretation were fully
embraced by the Hong Kong courts, and the interpretation was relied on as
the legal basis for disqualifying LegCo members. (15) The 2016 NPCSC inter-
pretation clearly shows the central government’s red line and its determi-
nation to aggressively intervene in matters relating to sovereignty. When
facing growing separatism in Hong Kong that challenges China’s territorial
integrity, Hong Kong’s judicial independence and the rule of law are sec-
ondary concerns at best. 
Facing the central government’s zero tolerance policy for separatism, the
Hong Kong government has utilised various legal technicalities, which had
been rarely used in the past, to crack down on pro-independence activism.
In 2016, many pro-independence localists running in the LegCo election
were stopped at the starting line as returning officials disqualified them on
the basis of their political positioning. (16) Pro-independence groups and po-
litical parties were not only prevented from registering under the Societies
Ordinance but were outlawed by the government. (17) Localist activists in-
volved in the Mong Kok riot received unprecedentedly heavy sentences on
conviction. (18) It is fair to say that legal mechanisms have been fully explored
and utilised, controversially in many cases, to address Beijing’s biggest con-
cern over the separatism issue. Such use, or abuse, of the law bears some
similarity to the widespread use of legalism in many authoritarian regimes
where governments have sought to use the law to “suppress dissent in al-
most all forms while maintaining legal and political credibility” (Gurnham
2012). The law itself has been deployed as a political instrument to intim-
idate political undesirables.
Another salient change in the post-OCM period was the emergence of
constitutional discourse, which aims to serve the strategy of further inte-
grating Hong Kong into China, economically, socially, and legally. The change
in tone has been reflected in official documents. The 1990 decision issued
by the NPC on the Basic Law proclaimed that the Basic Law “is constitu-
tional, [the] systems, policies and laws to be instituted after the establish-
ment of the HKSAR should be based on the Basic Law.” (19) From 2002 to
2014, reports made by the general secretary of the CCP to the NCCPC (20)
and government reports to the NPC all used the phrase that the central
government would “act in strict accordance with the Basic Law.” (21) It was
in the 2015 government report that “the PRC Constitution” was added be-
fore the Basic Law so that the statement reads: the central government
would “act in strict accordance with the Constitution and Basic Law.” Since
then, this phrase has been frequently used in official document. (22) Some
officials and mainland scholars have further developed the constitutional
discourse by elaborating on the effect of the PRC constitution in Hong Kong
and how it should be applied. (23)
The change in legal discourse reflects an increasing assertion of central au-
thority over Hong Kong. If the concept of “executive-led government” allows
the central authorities to rule through Hong Kong’s political institutions, the
concepts of “plenary power to govern Hong Kong” and “the applicability of
26 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1
11. See “Joint Statement of The Hong Kong Bar Association and The Law Society of Hong Kong in
Response to Criticisms of Judicial Independence in Hong Kong,” 18 August 2017,
https://www.hkba.org/events-publication/press-releases-coverage (accessed on 11 July 2018). 
12. Eddie Lee, “Beijing Throws the Book at Hong Kong’s Foreign Judges,” SCMP, 9 March 2017,
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2077521/experts-line-throw-book-
hong-kongs-foreign-judges (accessed on 11 July 2018). 
13. “Term of Non-permanent CFA Judges Extended,” Press release of the Government of the HKSAR,
21 February 2018, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201802/21/P2018022100260.htm?font-
Size=1 (accessed on 12 July 2018). 
14. Joyce Ng et al., “Legislative Council Disqualifications Shift the Balance of Power in Hong Kong,”
SCMP, 14 July 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2102733/legisla-
tive-council-disqualifications-shift-balance-power (accessed on 12 July 2018).
15. CACV 224/2016, 15 November, 2016, paras 19, 40(1) and 52. 
16. For the list of disqualified pro-independence candidates, see Kwong (2018).
17. Jeffie Lam and Tom Cheung, “Hong Kong separatist political party given 21-day ultimatum to
contest unprecedented ban,” SCMP, 17 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/pol-
itics/article/2155566/hong-kong-separatist-political-party-faces-landmark (accessed on 19 July
2018).
18. Jasmine Siu, “Mong Kok riot: Youngest of 10 defendants given heaviest sentence for ‘wanton use
of violence that took advantage of tolerant police’,” SCMP, 1 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/
news/hong-kong/hong-kong-law-and-crime/article/2148726/mong-kok-riot-youngest-10-de-
fendants-given (accessed on 19 July 2018).
19. “Decision of the NPC on the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC,” 4 April 1990, https://www.eleg-
islation.gov.hk/hk/A104!en.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y (accessed on 12 July 2018).
20. Full text of all previous reports of the General Secretary of the CCP to the CCP National Congress
are available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html (access on 12 July 2018). 
21. Bruce Lui, “憲法自動適用香港？讓官方報告來踢爆” (Xianfa zidong shiyong xianggang? Rang
guanfang baogao lai tibao, Constitution applies to Hong Kong automatically? Let official docu-
ments say), Ming Pao, 18 July 2018, A27.
22. Ibid.
23. Ng Kang-chung and Sum Lok-kei, “Qiao Xiaoyang’s mission to ‘promote and popularise’ Chinese
constitution in Hong Kong,” SCMP, 20 April 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/pol-
itics/article/2142503/qiao-xiaoyangs-mission-promote-and-popularise-chinese (accessed on 12
July 2018); Sum Lok-kei, “Liaison office legal chief tells Hong Kong: Basic Law is not your consti-
tution,” SCMP, 15 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2155297/
liaison-office-legal-chief-tells-hong-kong-basic-law-not (accessed on 20 July 2018).
Special feature
the PRC Constitution in Hong Kong” imply the possibility and necessity of di-
rect rule by central authorities in Hong Kong, parallel to Hong Kong’ au-
tonomous political system. Although the applicability of the PRC Constitution
in Hong Kong is highly controversial, the constitutional integration discourse
may be translated into concrete actions such as China’s National Security
Law in 2015, which for the first time includes Hong Kong and Macau in na-
tional legislation. The constitutional discourse may also serve to legitimise
measures aimed at further integrating Hong Kong into the mainland (e.g., the
joint rail checkpoint and the Greater Bay programme), to enhance the au-
thority of NPCSC Interpretations and decisions, and to assert potential influ-
ence on judges’ understanding and application of relevant mainland laws. 
The new legal discourse that emphasises the effect of the PRC Constitu-
tion not only echoes but also further entrenches the “legalisation without
democratisation” strategy. The constitutional discourse requires residents
of Hong Kong to respect, or at least not to interfere with, the socialist sys-
tem and Party-state rule in the mainland. The recognition of the legality of
one-party rule in China, including Hong Kong, may set up legal obstacles
to pro-democratic campaigning and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong,
since one-party rule is the very opposite of Hong Kong’s democratic aspi-
rations. The issue has loomed ever larger since the amendment of the PRC
Constitution in 2018, which added the Party’s leadership into the body text
of the Constitution. The constitutional integration discourse in Hong Kong
may create a political atmosphere that would foster the rise of local au-
thoritarian legalism, as its chilling effects have already been shown in Hong
Kong in the heated debate over whether politicians who are critical of one-
party rule should be banned from seeking political office. (24) It is also a ques-
tion of whether pro-democratic forces can continue their anti-Party
advocacy and activism, not to mention pro-independence activism that un-
dermines the sovereignty principle. Since the initiation of constitutional dis-
course, anti-authoritarianism activism and speeches that used to be
common practice have become controversial and uncertain. The hegemonic
use of “constitution” and “rule of law” rhetoric is also commonly seen in
many authoritarian states where the government has used similar legal dis-
course to justify authoritarianism and make it difficult for the opposition
to challenge the ruling authority as repressive legal measures have emerged
within constitutional framework (Rajah 2014: 55-64; Corrales 2015: 40).
In fact, the effect of the PRC Constitution was discussed at an early stage
in the drafting of the Basic Law. How to accommodate “one country, two
systems” into China’s socialist constitutional framework was a controversial
issue without a clear answer (Epstein 1989: 49-50). Scholars’ opinions on
that issue have changed depending on the evolving political dynamic (Cao
2018). As Cao Xudong (2018: 82) pointed out, in the first few years follow-
ing the handover, most scholars generally equated implementation of the
Basic Law with the implementation of the PRC Constitution in Hong Kong.
Therefore, the entire Constitution is valid in Hong Kong only through the
vehicle of the Basic Law, and it is not necessary to apply any specific pro-
visions of the Constitution to Hong Kong. However, since the fomenting of
the OCM and the rise of pro-independence activism, constitutional dis-
course has changed dramatically. Many mainland scholars, in tune with the
official agenda, have turned to stressing the effect of the PRC Constitution
in Hong Kong and have even argued that constitutional provisions should
apply to Hong Kong (Cao 2018: 82-3). In the three decades since the “one
country, two systems” concept was put forward, the ideological and legal
discourses have shifted from explaining and justifying “how a capitalist ter-
ritory will be legislated into existence by and within a socialist country”
(Epstein 1989: 49-50) to how a socialist constitution can be accommodated
in a capitalist and common law territory. 
Effect of Beijing’s legal strategies  
The question of whether and how the central government’s aggressive le-
galism has adversely affected Hong Kong’s rule of law permits no simple
answer, given the lack of empirical studies. Despite a series of controversial
events and conflicts with the central authorities, most prominent Hong
Kong judges have strongly affirmed the good maintenance of rule of law in
Hong Kong in the post-1997 period (Neuberger 2014; Mason 2011; Yu 2017:
60). But others in the legal community disagree, worrying about “storm
clouds on the horizon” (Bokhary 2013: 590) or expressly pointing out the
retrogression of Hong Kong’s rule of law, particularly in political and civil
rights. (25) Useful data shed light on the state of affairs of rule of law in Hong
Kong. According to the World Bank rule of law index, Hong Kong’s rule of
law has maintained approximately the same high level since 1996 (see Di-
agram 1), which is echoed by three other prominent rule of law indicators
provided by the Heritage Foundation, (26) Freedom House, and the World
Justice Project. (27) Nevertheless, the sub-indicator of the World Justice Pro-
ject (WJP) rule of law index shows that fundamental rights in Hong Kong
have obviously deteriorated since 2011 (Diagram 2). 
The combination of the four rule of law indexes is largely consistent with
the general perception of rule of law development in Hong Kong: the rule of
law remains strong in respect to protecting property rights and maintaining
social order, as shown by the World Bank (Diagram 1) and Heritage indexes,
which emphasise these two functions of the rule of law; fundamental rights
have exhibited a deteriorating trend according to the WJP Index (Diagram 2);
and democratic development remains stagnant, as shown by the Freedom
House Index (Diagram 3), which stresses democratic development. The data
to a certain extent prove the success of Beijing’s legal strategy, i.e., maintaining
a high level of rule of law in the conservative pro-capitalist and pro-market
dimensions, supplemented by a still high but selective guarantee of civil rights
with little democratic input. The dynamics of Hong Kong’s rule of law bear
the distinctive feature of authoritarian legalism: “the capacity of the state to
provide an arena of private law without any expansion of the public sphere”
(Jayasuriya 2001: 120). The law serves as a handmaiden for a flourishing mar-
ket economy but not as the facilitator of liberal political pluralism.
As Davis pointed out, the “legalisation without democratisation” strategy
has deepened Hong Kong and international society’s distrust of the Chinese
government’s commitment to carrying out the letter and spirit of the Basic
Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. While the central government
has adopted an aggressive approach to employing the law to curb the pace
of democracy in Hong Kong, it is inevitably eroding Hong Kong’s high degree
of autonomy along with the core values that are identified with the com-
mon law rule of law tradition (Davis 2015b: 296).
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In addition, the “legalisation without democratisation” strategy could also
generate the following side effects, which are probably beyond the central
government’s expectations.
First, it continuously creates a legitimised gap for pro-democracy momen-
tum. The Basic Law not only explicitly makes a promise of evolving toward,
though progressively, a democracy with evident liberal democratic values
but also prescribes specific procedures to fulfil this promise. However, in
practice, in order to slow down the pace of democratisation in Hong Kong
and to take the driver’s seat, the central authorities have interpreted the
core elements of democratic reform, such as “institutional selection” (jigou
xuanju 机构选举), the five steps required for passing a suffrage reform
scheme, and the legal discourse calling for “localised democracy” as opposed
to that of Western countries. Through a series of aggressive interpretations,
the central authorities have taken power away from Hong Kong in defining
the pace and meaning of democracy. Like the hybrid constitutions of other
authoritarian regimes, the gap between the democratic undertakings pre-
scribed in writing and the failure to fulfil them generates continuous de-
mand and catalyses pro-democracy momentum for political movements
such as the OCM. 
Second, “legalisation without democratisation” has given rise to unforeseen
disillusionment with the law and significant radicalisation of the democratic
movement into pro-independence activism that aims to overthrow the ex-
isting constitutional arrangement. The “legalisation” strategy that excludes
moral input de-legitimises the role of law in a changing society. Since the
central government and Hong Kong legal institutions have used legal mech-
anisms and discourses politically and opportunistically to criminalise social
movement participants and crack down on opposition politicians, it seems
increasingly difficult for pro-democracy forces (not to mention pro-indepen-
dence activists) to pursue their causes within the current legal framework.
Their confidence and enthusiasm for using the courts as a crucial battlefield
for their causes in the early years after 1997 (Tam 2013: 124-5) seem to
have waned after encountering increasing difficulty in trying to translate po-
litical pursuits into legal action. Criticism of the “conservative” nature of the
law has naturally arisen in Hong Kong, with some aggressive legal profes-
sionals arguing that rule of law can no longer be meaningfully discussed
without referring to politics, (28) which ironically echoes the Marxist view of
law as well as Schmidt’s that has been widely cited by many mainland schol-
ars to endorse Party-state rule. While some of the pro-democracy forces in
Hong Kong doubt the law’s usefulness in promoting democratic change,
some mainland scholars also point out the law’s conservative nature and its
limited ability to respond to the changes Hong Kong society needs to make
(Zheng 2017: 26). Although the two sides have different agendas and take
distinct moral stances, both question the function of law in a society facing
political challenges. Ironically, the rule of law underpinned Hong Kong’s past
success and now it is the Beijing authorities who appear to be the firmest
and fiercest defenders of the law (and order). Naturally, the legality embraced
by the authoritarian government has further fuelled suspicion about the
value of law and the judiciary in the pursuit of democracy.
It is interesting to note that both “legalisation without democratisation”
and the recent “constitutional integration” effort, to a great extent, con-
sciously or unconsciously, follow Britain’s footsteps during the colonial pe-
riod. The successful transplant of the common law in Hong Kong
contributed to Britain’s successful governing of Hong Kong without imple-
menting democracy. There has been a growing realisation among mainland
scholars of the remarkable achievement of the common law in Hong Kong’s
good governance and its influence in shaping the rule of law cultural men-
tality (Zheng 2017). The Chinese government obviously has drawn on the
British experience in designing the political system for post-1997 Hong
Kong, as Chinese officials and law makers have publicly admired the suc-
cessful model of British governance marked by robust economic-social de-
velopment with an apolitical society, and they intended to maintain the
colonial capitalist economic system by institutional design under the Basic
Law (Kuan 1998: 1424). So far, the continuing “legalisation without
democratisation” strategy has been relatively successful for Beijing, as man-
ifested in the effective control of the pace of democratisation, the handling
of the OCM, and the suffocation of pro-independence activism. 
It should be noted that, despite the dazzling legal saga of the past thirty
years, the core interests and bottom-line of the central government in im-
plementing the Basic Law have remained unchanged since 1989, i.e., to
maintain state sovereignty and national security (including safeguarding
the Party-state regime), to curb full democratisation in Hong Kong, and to
maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong (Yang 2013: 71). (29) The
conflicts between Beijing and Hong Kong and the issues that have invited
Beijing’s intervention illustrate well what concerns the central government
the most (see Table 1). Over the past 30 years, changes in the central gov-
ernment’s legal tactics appear to have been made in response to the chang-
ing situations in Hong Kong society, but upon closer examination, they all
revolve around the aforementioned core interests of Beijing. These core in-
terests determine when and how the central government intervenes in dis-
puted issues. 
In some circumstances when core interests were involved, extra-legal or
illegal measures were even taken, significantly impairing Hong Kong’s rule
of law. The most striking cases were the forced disappearance of five Cause-
way Bay booksellers and the Chinese billionaire Xiao Jianhua. Compared to
legal measures allowed by the Basic Law, those extra-legal measures, which
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go against the “legalisation without (full) democratisation” principle, easily
undermine the legitimacy of Beijing’s governance over Hong Kong and cast
doubts on Beijing’s sincerity in complying with the Basic Law. Therefore, the
Beijing authorities are still largely constrained from using such measures,
despite their convenience and effectiveness. (30) Beijing has also used other
soft lawful measures, mostly political and economic, that have yielded ripple
effects on freedom of speech and freedom of association in Hong Kong,
such as gradually squeezing out independent publications through the pur-
chase of media and publishers in Hong Kong by Chinese buyers, (31) high-
profile official criticism and media attacks to put pressure on progressive
academics (Chan and Kerr 2016), and supporting various pro-Beijing civil
organisations to counteract the opposition (Kwong 2018). 
Influence over local legal communities: 
De-politicising or democratising the law?
Before the handover, Epstein (1989: 74) warned that mainland legal lan-
guage, personnel, and the respective strengths of public policy and morality
were potential, indirect influences that could imperceptibly change Hong
Kong law. Another scholar forecasted that political rather than institutional
factors may have a more significant influence on Hong Kong’s common law
(Wesley-Smith 1989: 36). After 20 years, tangible factors such as language,
personnel, and institutions are still limited in influencing Hong Kong’s legal
system, while other imperceptible factors have become the major concern.
The following section tries to explore whether and how the legal strategies
of the central authorities have influenced the “common law mind” in Hong
Kong, which is “a hardy locus of resistance to fundamental change” (Wes-
ley-Smith 1989: 36). The two key questions addressed are whether the ethos
of Hong Kong’s legal professionals has changed and whether the judiciary
has become politicised under the shadow of China’s authoritarianism.
The caste of lawyers and their modes of thought have been regarded as
influential in Hong Kong as everywhere else in maintaining the common
law system. When the legal profession in Hong Kong became exposed to
wider ideas and new political tensions in the post-1997 period, the common
law may have become more subject to non-traditional influences (Wesley-
Smith 1989: 36). The impact of Beijing’s legal discourses, such as the em-
phasis on the effect of the PRC Constitution in Hong Kong, the rejection of
Western-type democracy, and the supremacy of sovereignty, on the ethos
of Hong Kong’s legal profession is difficult to gauge, for such change is prob-
ably too subtle to perceive, given the lack of systematic study. (32) However,
some trends may enlighten us on the matter.
First, for pro-democratic legal professionals in Hong Kong, “legalisation
without democratisation” has prompted the rise of cause lawyering. As Tam
argued, the transfer of sovereignty and implementation of the Basic Law
have encouraged lawyers to pursue political causes in their advocacy. The
Basic Law, along with the Bill of Rights Ordinance, provides new legal open-
ings for the first generation of lawyers to use courts as their battlefields, as
both the administrative and legislative branches are designed to the advan-
tage of the establishment (Tam 2013: 124). Thus, they work closely with
other pro-democracy politicians and activists to translate almost all highly
political issues into legal ones through judicial review. 
Second, as political reform has been curbed and room for promoting fun-
damental rights in the courts has narrowed in recent years, some progres-
sive lawyers have turned to engaging in more radical activism outside
formal legal institutions by participating in direct actions or political cam-
paigns, as illustrated by four silent marches by lawyers, the establishment
of the Basic Law Article 45 Concern Group and the Civic Party, the salient
role of legal professionals in the OCM, and the emergence of politically ori-
ented groups organised by legal professionals, e.g. the “Progressive Lawyers
Group” and “Law Dream.”
Third, the mindset of the overall legal professionals in Hong Kong is more
complicated and divided under the influence of China. Although the Hong
Kong Bar Association (HKBA) remains pro-liberal and outspoken while the
Law Society of Hong Kong (LSHK) is still relatively moderate and conserva-
tive, as Lee (2017: 5) argued, it seems that “liberal legalism” remains a thread
that binds barristers and solicitors together whenever fundamental rights
and judicial authority are seen to be at risk. For instance, the HKBA and the
LSHK appeared to be unified on some issues, such as the Article 23 legisla-
tion in 2003 (Lee 2017: 5) and their response to criticism of judicial inde-
pendence in Hong Kong. (33) Pro-democratic candidates have continuously
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won the legal functional constituency seat in LegCo since 1985, even
though the majority of the legal practitioners are solicitors (Lee 2017: 5).
In 2014, LSHK President Ambrose Lam San-keung was removed for his open
praise of the 2014 white paper and the CCP (Lee 2017: 5), and the human
rights lawyer Philip Dykes was surprisingly elected Bar Association chairman
in 2018. (34)
Nevertheless, there is also concern that Beijing’s co-optation of legal pro-
fessional elites may influence the “common law mind” of Hong Kong
lawyers. Some facts seem to support this concern. In recent years, even the
outspoken HKBA has been criticised for being much less outspoken since
2006, when Rimsky Yuen became HKBA chairman, and his successors have
also kept a distance from political issues. (35) The 2000s saw the emergence
of a number of active pro-establishment Hong Kong lawyers (e.g., Lawrence
Ma and Wong Kwok Yan Christopher) and lawyers-cum-LegCo members
(e.g., Priscilla Leung Mei-fun, Holden Chow Ho-ding, Junius Ho Kwan-yiu)
who endorse and promote Beijing’s political and legal perspectives on many
controversial issues. Despite the removal of the former LSHK President Am-
brose Lam San-Keung in 2014, the 2018 council election of the LSHK
showed the mobilising power of the establishment bloc, which made best
use of the proxy vote mechanism to help pro-establishment candidates win
seats. (36) The campaign reflected the pro-Beijing camp’s concern about “lib-
eral voices getting louder in the traditionally conservative profession.” (37)
In July 2018, Melissa Pang, the newly elected LSHK President and a pro-Bei-
jing lawyer, openly commented that the PRC Constitution is the supreme
law that should be applied in Hong Kong, (38) echoing a highly controversial
speech made by the liaison office’s legal chief, Wang Zhenmin, three days
before. (39) Moreover, reformist lawyers risk being marginalised within their
ranks as their efforts to run for leadership of professional associations and
their cause lawyering are often criticised as attempts to politicise the law,
while relatively conservative legal professionals are portrayed by pro-Beijing
media as the true defenders of rule of law for clinging to the neutrality of
the law. (40)
As to the Hong Kong judiciary, its politicisation and independence have
become a major concern in recent years, mostly due to the growth of po-
litically sensitive cases and Beijing’s increasing presence in many of those
cases through either the formal legal mechanism or high-profile propaganda
campaigns. Using the law to postpone politics inevitably brings highly con-
tested political disputes to the courts, giving rise to the perception that
Hong Kong’s judiciary and law have become politicised. (41) While prominent
judges firmly assert the courts’ independence and neutrality, there are dis-
agreements among scholars regarding this issue. Some argue that judicial
independence is still well maintained and that the real problem is judicial
authority (Chen and Lo 2017: 140-1). Another view is that politicisation of
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the judicial agenda does not necessarily mean politicisation of the courts
(Zhu 2017b: 35). 
This article argues that the Hong Kong judiciary has demonstrated a highly
de-politicalised rather than politicalised stance as it persistently emphasises
the notion of rule of law with a focus on the rationale of “law and order.”
Avoiding taking political morality into account in the adjudication of sen-
sitive cases, the Hong Kong courts have continuously sent a message to the
public, through top judges’ speeches or judgments of high-profile cases, that
the “image of the rule of law was (…) complying with existing legal order
and the well-functioning of Hong Kong society” (Ho 2017: 142), while other
substantial values and agendas, such as promoting democracy and political
reform, should not be debated or considered in the judicial arena. (42) In sharp
contrast to the Taiwan courts’ acquittal decisions in the trials of Sunflower
Movement participants, the Hong Kong courts have generally demonstrated
a more restrictive attitude toward civil disobedience and a stronger empha-
sis on the existing legal order. While the Taiwanese court regarded the cause
of the Sunflower Movement as a “public interest” and took it into account
in making its decision, the Hong Kong courts, in most of the OCM and Mong
Kok riot-related cases, explicitly ruled that the court’s decision should ex-
clude any political factors, including the defendants’ political motivation. (43)
In trying politically sensitive cases, being caught in the middle of the cen-
tral government’s hostility toward democracy and local civil society’s de-
mand for democracy, Hong Kong courts have tried to strike a delicate
balance between, on the one hand, protecting fundamental rights (which
has been increasingly intertwined with pro-democracy and localist ac-
tivism), and on the other hand, upholding the central government’s author-
ity without antagonising Beijing. Since the 1999 Lau Kong Yung case, (44) the
Hong Kong courts have changed their previous opinion that the courts have
the power to review NPCSC interpretations, but instead have held that the
NPCSC enjoys freestanding power to interpret the Basic Law. The courts
maintained a highly deferential attitude toward the NPCSC in subsequent
cases, thus avoiding direct confrontation with the central authorities as they
did in 1999. (45) In cases that touch upon the sovereignty issue and the cen-
tral authorities’ sensitive spots, such as the 1998 desecration of the national
flag case, (46) the 2016 oath-taking cases, (47) the 2011 Congo case, (48) and
the 2018 joint rail checkpoint case, (49) the court’s rulings have firmly
stressed and upheld the “one country” principle and existing constitutional
order, hailed by some mainland scholars as the growth of national con-
sciousness among Hong Kong judges (Hao 2013: 83-91). It is doubtful
whether there has been a perceptible increase in so-called national con-
sciousness, since even before the first NPCSC interpretation was issued in
1999, the court had already shown great respect for the “one country” prin-
ciple under the new constitutional order immediately after the handover
in cases such as the 1997 Ma Wai Kwan case and the 1998 desecration of
the national flag case. (50) It is therefore hard to say that the transfer of
sovereignty has shaped the position of Hong Kong courts. It is probably the
inherent conservative dimension of the common law and the judiciary that
determines the pro-establishment inclination of the courts in a semi-
democracy under the shadow of authoritarianism. 
Despite its deferential attitude toward the NPCSC’s authority, the Hong
Kong judiciary still plays a crucial role in protecting fundamental rights and
checking the power of the HKSAR government in many politically sensitive
cases where the sovereignty issue is not the focal point, e.g., the 2005 Fa-
Lungong case (51) and the “seven policemen case.” Compared with their def-
erential attitude toward the central authorities, the courts demonstrated a
robust stance in exercising judicial review power over the HKSAR executive
and legislative authorities, as shown in the oath-taking cases.
The emphasis on the apolitical nature of the courts is a necessary tech-
nical apparatus for the Hong Kong courts to resist real or potential in-
terference from Beijing and to strike a delicate balance between pressure
from the central authorities and a strong grassroots demand for democ-
racy. Nevertheless, the de-politicisation strategy has its downside. To a
certain extent, the courts have unwittingly collaborated with the central
government’s “legalisation without democratisation” strategy in many
politically sensitive cases, particularly the 2016 oath-taking cases, the
jailing of land protesters in 2017, (52) and the OCM – and Mong Kok riot-
related cases. The harsh punishment imposed by the law and the empha-
sis on maintaining social stability have alienated pro-democratic activists
and deterred like-minded citizens from joining social campaigns (Ho
2017: 142). Most defendants who were involved in civil disobedience and
massive protests were very cooperative and demonstrated a deferential
attitude toward the law in trials, in sharp contrast to many mainland
human rights activists and lawyers who have been vocally critical of law
and have directly confronted judicial authorities in the courts. Compared
to an undeveloped legal system, an advanced rule-of-law system in an
undemocratic context seems to be a more efficient instrument in con-
taining social activism and political dissidence. The emphasis on the pro-
cedural dimension of classic liberalism can cater to tyrannical regimes.
Liberalism and rule of law can be construed in a restrictive rather than
progressive sense, as is the case in Hong Kong (Lee 2017: 6). A similar ju-
dicial conservativism could also be seen in colonial Hong Kong and other
hybrid regimes such as Singapore. The judiciary alone, even if highly de-
veloped, can hardly resist the pressure of authoritarianism and shoulder
the burden of promoting democracy in an undemocratic context. Hong
Kong is simply no exception. 
Conclusion: Rule of law under
authoritarianism
“Legalisation without (full) democratisation” has been the core pillar of
Beijing’s overall legal strategy for governing Hong Kong. Firmly entrenched
since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, it has remained the cornerstone of
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its governing strategy over the past decades. The official legal discourse has
evolved from emphasising the notion of “executive-led government” to
“plenary power to govern Hong Kong” and “the application of the PRC Con-
stitution to Hong Kong.” In practice, Beijing has incrementally redefined
some provisions and concepts related to the Basic Law to serve its governing
purpose. (53) In the post-OCM period, the central government has further
stressed the application of the PRC Constitution in Hong Kong in response
to the rising secessionist clamour and to serve the integration strategy. Al-
though its power to interfere with the operation of Hong Kong’s rule of law
is still largely circumscribed by the Basic Law, the central government never
hesitates to take a tough approach in crucial issues that touch on its core
interests.
On the surface, the “legalisation without democratisation” principle is
quite efficient for the time being. The central authorities have efficiently
stressed the rhetorical notion of the rule of law and have skilfully used lim-
ited but crucial legal channels, particularly NPCSC interpretations and de-
cisions, to prevent dramatic political reform and to suffocate separatist
activism in Hong Kong. However, the “legalisation without democratisa-
tion” and “integration” strategies largely conflict with the demands of a
significant portion of Hong Kong’s civil society for full democracy, a high
degree of autonomy, maintenance of a liberal rule of law tradition, and
anti-mainlandisation. Such measures also create a gap that generates con-
tinuing momentum for pro-democracy campaigning, give rise to suspicions
over the role of law in advancing democracy, and radicalise a portion of
the pro-democracy campaign into pro-independence activism. The tension
brought by “legalisation without democratisation” will continue in the fu-
ture, and further enhancement of legality will not resolve the inherent ten-
sions. It is difficult for Beijing to copy the model of British rule over colonial
Hong Kong, as Kuan precisely foresaw in 1997: the “foundation for the past
practice in governing through consultation, i.e., elite solidarity and lack of
mass mobilisation, (…) no longer exists” after the handover (Kuan 1998:
1445).
Influence by legalisation without democratisation brings a worrying trend
of rising authoritarian legalism in Hong Kong, as local authorities have in-
creasingly utilised legal means to crack down on separatism and have con-
strained political space for other oppositional forces, catering to the central
government’s agenda. Those legal measures have posed an evident and po-
tential threat to fundamental rights and freedom. Facing pressures from
both the central authorities and bottom-up demand for democracy, the
Hong Kong judiciary has adopted a depoliticisation stance and has demon-
strated an inclination to emphasise the existing legal order while excluding
any political factors outside the courts. On the one hand, this is conducive
to resisting erosion by the central power, and the court has done well so
far in defending the liberal values of Hong Kong’s common law (Chan 2018:
373). On the other hand, it has narrowed the space for legal and political
mobilisation that directly challenges the central authorities, to the disap-
pointment of the social movement sector and some progressive legal pro-
fessionals, who have begun to doubt the rule of law under the influence of
rising authoritarian legality and thus have turned to more politilised ac-
tivism outside the courts. 
In the contemporary world, there is perhaps no other legal complex similar
to that of the HKSAR: a highly developed common law system that exists
within an authoritarian civil law system with so-called socialist characteris-
tics. The rule of law issue in Hong Kong is inevitably intertwined with that in
China. Under the shadow of authoritarianism, political and rule of law advo-
cates in Hong Kong have begun to share the same fate as their mainland
counterparts, who have struggled between the thin and thick versions of the
law. They have confronted the same typical “Chinese characteristics” of so-
cialist rule of law, such as the “equation of law and power” (Pils 2017: 31)
and “employing arguments that seem convenient in the moment” (ibid.: 6).
The law may provide both opportunities and obstacles for the causes of both
groups. Thus, to democratise the law, or to neutralise the law, that is the
question.
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53. E.g., the procedures for approving Hong Kong’s political reform (Appendix 1 and 2), and the scope
and procedures of NPCSC interpretations (Article 158). 
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